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Testing the Limits 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 WHILE THE DEFAULT position is that  ‘ an Englishman still remains at liberty at his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he pleases ’ , 1 the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 allows certain 
categories of claimant, including adult children, to seek discretionary provision from an 
estate in a manner that overrides a will and/or the intestacy rules. This chapter considers 
a case ultimately called  Ilott v The Blue Cross , 2 the first case under the 1975 Act to reach 
the highest judicial level. The case involved an estranged but needy daughter who had 
been  ‘ disinherited ’ by her mother in favour of various animal charities. As Lady Hale was 
eventually to put it, the case raised 
 some profound questions about the nature of family obligations, the relationship between 
family obligations and the state, and the relationship between the freedom of property owners 
to dispose of their property as they see fi t and their duty to fulfi l their family obligations. 3 
 This chapter begins with a brief history of family provision legislation, including its 
application by courts in cases involving adult children before  Ilott . It then examines the 
factual background of the  Ilott case in some depth, making more use of an interview 
that the claimant gave to the  Daily Mail than the author might ideally have liked. 4 It then 
considers the long history of the litigation (caused in part by the traditional two-stage 
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approach to claims under the Act) 5 leading up to the Supreme Court ’ s decision, including 
the fi rst instance decision of District Judge Million that has not been published in full. 6 
The Supreme Court ’ s judgments themselves are then analysed, including with reference 
to  Ilott ’ s early impact on academic writing and subsequent case law. By way of conclu-
sion, the chapter makes the argument for  Ilott as a  ‘ landmark case ’ . 
 II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FAMILY PROVISION 
 It has been seen that the predominant principle of English succession law is that of 
testamentary freedom. While Nield claims that the principle has existed since feudal 
times, 7 Borkowski argues that  ‘ testamentary freedom was severely limited for much of 
English legal history ’ and that testators were substantially unencumbered for only about 
a century. 8 The testamentary freedom principle contrasts with the position in many civil 
law jurisdictions, where testamentary freedom is limited by compulsory portions of the 
estate being reserved for particular family members. 9 The English Law Commission 
considered the introduction of compulsory portions for family members in 1971, 10 but 
subsequently rejected the idea. 11 Family provision is therefore an important exception to 
the general rule of testamentary freedom. 
 The concept of family provision did not originate in England. The New Zealand 
Testator ’ s Family Maintenance Act 1900 was the fi rst statute in a common law jurisdic-
tion to place testators under a legal duty to provide for their family and dependants. 12 
The Act was an attempt to prevent men from leaving their wives and children destitute by 
bequeathing their entire estate to persons outside the immediate family circle. It has been 
described as a  ‘ highly signifi cant landmark in the way in which common law jurisdictions 
dealt with succession to property on death ’ , since its principles were adopted by all the 
Australian states and most of the Canadian provinces. 13 
 The New Zealand statute was also infl uential in England, where considerable public 
and press support for reform to qualify testamentary freedom was claimed in the 1920s. 14 
The scope of family provision statutes in England and Wales, Australia and New Zealand 
has widened signifi cantly compared to their original forms. 15 An applicant under the 
original English Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 had to be a spouse, an  unmarried 
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or disabled daughter, or a son who was under 21 or disabled. 16 Relief was limited to main-
tenance and subject to a maximum award of two-thirds of the net estate, the Act applied 
only to testate succession and there were restrictions on an adult child ’ s ability to apply 
based on the proportion of the estate left to a spouse. Signifi cantly, Probert has empha-
sised that  ‘ the 1938 Act was the fi rst legislative interference with freedom of testation as 
regards  children ’ , 17 but both the provisions and the application of the Act were cautious. 18 
 The 1938 Act was then the subject of piecemeal reforms. These included the extension 
of its application to intestacy, 19 the inclusion of the former spouse who had not remar-
ried as an eligible applicant 20 and the removal of the restrictions on the proportion of the 
estate that a claim could exhaust. 21 
 The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 removed the  ‘ main-
tenance ’ restriction for spouses. Most signifi cantly for present purposes, the 1975 Act 
extended the potential class of applicants to include all legal children of the deceased, in 
addition to those whom the deceased treated as a child of the family, and those who were 
factually dependent on the deceased irrespective of whether they had a familial relation-
ship with her (cohabitants later being included through the Law Reform (Succession) 
Act 1995). Probert alleges that when the Law Commission recommended the removal of 
age limits for adult children, 22  ‘ it provided no principled reasons for doing so and did not 
seem to envisage that many claims by adult children would be regarded as meritorious ’ . 23 
In his 2003  Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History , however, Cretney opined 
that the distinction between the maintenance standard and the spousal standard  ‘ might 
come to be seen as an anomaly ’ . 24 
 A. Claims by Adult Children 
 It is now necessary to outline the courts ’ approach to claims by adult children before 
 Ilott . Under the 1975 Act, the court must ascertain whether the will and/or the intestacy 
rules  ‘ make reasonable fi nancial provision ’ 25 for the applicant ’ s maintenance. 26 The term 
 ‘ maintenance ’ , in turn, has been defi ned as in  Re Dennis as encompassing  ‘ payments 
which, directly or indirectly, enable the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of his 
daily living at whatever standard of living is appropriate to him ’ . 27 If the court concludes 
that reasonable fi nancial provision has not been made, it must then decide which of its 
powers to exercise in order to remedy that insuffi ciency. 28 Section 3 of the Act contains 
a list of factors to which the court should have regard in making its determinations, 
304 Brian Sloan
  29  1975 Act, s 3(1). 
  30  1975 Act, s 3(3). 
  31  See generally  G  Miller ,  ‘ Provision for Adult Children under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975 ’ [ 1995 ]  Conveyancer  & Property Lawyer  22 . 
  32  1975 Act, s 3(3). 
  33  N  Lowe and  G  Douglas ,  Bromley ’ s Family Law ,  11th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2015 ) 983. 
  34  Peart and Borkowski (n 13) 333. 
  35  Re Dennis (n 27) 145. 
  36  Re Hancock (decd) [ 1998 ]  2 FLR 346, 351 . The idea of moral duty receives some attention in Nicola Peart ’ s 
contribution ( chapter 12 ) to this volume. 
  37  Myers v Myers [ 2004 ]  EWHC 1944 (Fam), [2005] WTLR 851. 
  38  Re Coventry (n 1). 
  39  H  Conway ,  ‘ Do Parents Always Know Best ? Posthumous Provision and Adult Children ’ in  W  Barr (ed), 
 Modern Studies in Property Law ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2015 )  118 . 
  40  This has been caused mainly by the  ‘ misinterpretation ’ of  Re Coventry , which prevailed for some time: 
 A   Borkowski ,  ‘ Moral Obligation and Family Provision:  Re Hancock (Deceased) and  Espinosa v Bourke ’ ( 1999 ) 
 11  Child  & Family Law Quarterly  305 . 
  41  J  Wilson and  R  Bailey-Harris ,  ‘ Family Provision: The Adult Child and Moral Obligation ’ ( 2005 )  35  Family 
Law  555 . 
  42  Espinosa v Bourke [ 1999 ]  1 FLR 747, 755 . 
some of which apply to all applicants 29 and some of which are aimed specifi cally at claims 
by children of the deceased. 30 
 The focus of the award of relief is very much on the future needs of the applicant 
considered at the date of the hearing, due to the  ‘ maintenance ’ limitation. 31 For  example, 
the Act specifi es  ‘ the manner in which the applicant was being or in which he might 
expect to be educated or trained ’ in applications by adult children, a distinctly forward-
looking and potentially limiting factor. 32 Indeed, although the award is not necessarily 
limited to providing  ‘ bare necessities ’ , 33 it was suggested by Peart and Borkowski that the 
English judiciary adopted a  ‘ parsimonious ’ approach to claims by adult children. 34 This 
is encapsulated in Browne-Wilkinson J ’ s remark in  Re Dennis that: 
 A person who is physically capable of earning his own living faces a diffi cult task in getting 
provision made for him, because the court is inclined to ask:  ‘ Why should anybody else make 
provision for you if you are capable of maintaining yourself ? ’ 35 
 It seemed that a claim by an adult child in employment and/or with future earning capac-
ity was unlikely to succeed in England unless the applicant could show that the deceased 
owed a moral obligation to him, or that some other special circumstances justify the 
order, 36 although the size of the estate was a pertinent consideration. 37 In  Re Coventry , 38 
 ‘ regarded as the leading authority ’ , 39 no provision was made for an adult son who had 
lived with his now-deceased father for a signifi cant period and was earning only modestly, 
in circumstances where his needy mother would have been prejudiced by an award to him. 
It was suggested that a moral obligation could be generated by an applicant ’ s forgoing 
of an adequate living to look after a disabled parent. However, neither the fi rst instance 
judge nor the Court of Appeal could fi nd suffi cient evidence of such a sacrifi ce on the 
facts. 
 The tendency to emphasise a need to show moral obligations owed by the deceased 
in the English case law involving adult children 40 has been criticised as a value-laden 
relic of earlier legislation. 41 In  Espinosa v Bourke , Butler-Sloss LJ denied that the Court 
of Appeal had placed a  ‘ gloss ’ on the language of the present legislation, 42 under which 
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the court is directed to have regard, inter alia, to  ‘ any obligations and responsibilities 
which the deceased had towards any applicant ’ . 43 All of the judges in that case expressed 
misgivings about the use of the word  ‘ moral ’ , emphasising that it was intended simply 
to avoid restricting relevant obligations to legal ones. In  Re Hancock , moreover, it had 
previously been confi rmed that a moral obligation was not a precondition of a success-
ful application. 44 The concept of a moral obligation remained in evidence, however, 
and Borkowski noted that the courts were often reluctant to clarify its meaning. 45 There 
is some suggestion that care could be a relevant  ‘ moral obligation ’ , even though it is 
not necessary to demonstrate one. In  Re Jennings , Henry LJ considered a hypothetical 
scenario in which an adult child gave up a university place  ‘ to nurse the deceased through 
his long last illness ’ . 46 Henry LJ suggested that there would be a  ‘ clear ’ moral obligation 
on the deceased to enable the applicant to take up that place. 47 
 In  Espinosa v Bourke , it was accepted that the applicant was owed a moral obligation 
by her deceased father because of the care that she provided for him (as well as because 
of a promise that he would leave certain property to her). 48 The fi rst instance judge found 
that any obligation had been discharged by the deceased during his life through direct 
transfers and benefi ts in kind. On appeal, however, it was held that the judge had focused 
too heavily on the obligation question at the expense of considering the applicant ’ s 
fi nancial position. The Court of Appeal concentrated instead on the applicant ’ s lack of 
earning capacity and the promise of provision that the father had made in allowing the 
applicant ’ s appeal and making an order. The fi rst instance judge was infl uenced by the 
fact that the applicant ’ s commitment to her father dwindled, implying that a failure to 
care for a deceased parent may have a negative effect on a claim under the Act. Although 
the Court of Appeal made an order on the basis of her need and the promise made to 
her, Butler-Sloss LJ admitted that the daughter ’ s eventual neglect of her father could 
have counted against any obligation owed to her because of her care. 49 Provision was 
nevertheless made despite the neglect and the fact that she found herself in necessitous 
circumstances due at least in part to a lifestyle of which the deceased clearly disapproved. 
 If disapproval was not fatal to claims under the Act, nor was estrangement. In  Gold v 
Curtis , provision was made for an estranged daughter with mental health issues. 50 A need 
for maintenance was key, however: on the facts of  Re Jennings , no obligation was found 
on the part of the deceased father in spite of the fact that he had failed to maintain the 
applicant (a 45-year-old successful businessman at the time of the father ’ s death) during 
his minority. 
 As for the relationship between family provision and state benefi ts, courts were gener-
ally reluctant to attach a great deal of signifi cance to the availability of state support for a 
family provision applicant, particularly in cases involving large estates. 51 In summarising 
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the courts ’ approach to claims by adult children before  Ilott , Conway wrote that  ‘ [s]ince 
 Re Coventry , much judicial time and effort has been expended on trying to formulate a 
workable and coherent set of universal principles to supplement the statutory framework 
for determining family provision claims by independent adult children ’ , but  ‘ [t]he extent 
to which courts have succeeded in this objective is questionable ’ . 52 She was also of the 
view that  ‘ there are no discernible trends in the value of any award relative to the value 
of the deceased ’ s estate, and few attempts to rationalise the sum given to the claimant by 
the court ’ . 53 
 III. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE  ILOTT CASE 
 Melita Jackson was born in 1934. 54 At 21, she married Thomas, who was killed in an 
industrial accident at the BBC (falling 600 feet from a broadcasting mast while not 
wearing a helmet) 55 just four years later while Melita was pregnant with their daughter, 
Heather. In 1978, at the age of 17, Heather left home to go and live with her boyfriend 
Nick Ilott at his parents ’ home. Heather did so without telling Melita, who disapproved 
of Nick because she thought that he would not make much of his life (apparently because 
of his parents ’ circumstances) 56 and that Heather was thus wasting her future. Melita 
was shocked and called the police. Heather was found at the Ilotts ’ home and refused to 
return to Melita. 
 Heather married Nick in 1983, again without telling Melita. She gave birth to A the 
following year, and set up home with Nick and A in a cottage in Ware 57 in Hertfordshire 
rented from a housing association. She subsequently gave birth to B in 1987, L in 1988, 
M in 1991 and E in 1996. At the time of Judge Million ’ s decision, she and Nick lived in 
the same Hertfordshire house with the youngest four children. She had not done any 
paid work since A ’ s birth, she and Nick having decided that she would be a stay-at-home 
mother. Having worked as a delivery driver, he developed a back problem and worked 
part-time as a non-speaking supporting actor in television and fi lms at the time of the 
judgment. By the time of the 2014 High Court judgment, evidence (by way of anonymous 
letter) had emerged that Nick was offering  ‘ spiritualist services ’ , but he claimed not to 
profi t from these and Parker J discounted the evidence. 58 
 At the time of Judge Million ’ s judgment, A was a care worker living away from home, 
B was living at home and working as a plumber ’ s apprentice, and the younger three lived 
at home and were either in or seeking education. Heather and Nick ’ s joint net annual 
income was put at around  £ 15,000, over half of which came from tax credits, plus  £ 5,000 
in housing and council tax benefi ts. They were left with just over  £ 14,000 after payment 
of rent and council tax, and  ‘ lived modestly and within their means ’ . 59 
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 Heather and Melita attempted to reconcile over the years: fi rst when Heather was 
pregnant with A until a few months after his birth, then between April and June 1994, 
and fi nally for six months between 1999 and 2000. Signifi cantly, Melita made a will in 
1984 (while she and Heather were on speaking terms) that excluded Heather. The ending 
of each short-lived reconciliation was characterised by bitterness and aggression. 
 In 2002, Melita made her last will. In it, she left a  £ 5,000 legacy to the BBC Benevolent 
Fund 60 (which had apparently provided for her following Thomas ’ s death) 61 and divided 
the residue between the Blue Cross, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and 
the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. She wrote a letter of wishes 
explaining her decision to exclude Heather from the will, referring to the 1978 separa-
tion and claiming that she had seen her daughter only twice since then, that Heather had 
made no effort to reconcile with her and that Heather had used  ‘ lies and deceit ’ . Judge 
Million found that the letter contained  ‘ many inaccuracies ’ and was  ‘ unfairly critical ’ of 
Heather. 62 He also found that 
 the overwhelming and longstanding reason why Mrs Jackson made no provision to her daugh-
ter was that she had left the home of her mother at the age of 17  … to go to and remain with a 
man of whom the mother disapproved. 63 
 While Melita had asked for an apology and received one in both oral and written 
form, Judge Million was of the view that  ‘ the only apology which would have satisfi ed 
Mrs J ackson is one in which Mrs Ilott in effect rejected her own husband ’ . 64 
 Melita had no particular connection with the animal charities between which she had 
divided her residuary estate, or animal welfare or birdlife more generally, with Heather 
recalling having only a single pet dog while she was growing up and suspecting that Melita 
had benefi ted the charities  ‘ to hurt [Heather] even more ’ . 65 
 Melita died in 2004 at the age of 70, having lived alone since the death of her long-
term companion in 1996. Her body was not discovered until several days after her death. 
Judge Million described her as  ‘ lonely, isolated and reclusive ’ by the end of her life, 66 and 
the only mourners at her funeral were Heather, Nick, their fi ve children, Melita ’ s solicitor 
and one other person. Melita ’ s net estate was valued at  £ 486,000 in cash or liquid assets, 
described as  ‘ signifi cant  … but not unusually large ’ . 67 
 Heather claimed that at least some of the money represented by Melita ’ s estate was 
inherited by Melita following Thomas ’ s death, notwithstanding the fact that Melita 
claimed to have been left  ‘ penniless ’ . 68 Heather described her motivation in bringing the 
1975 Act claim as not being about the money per se, but about  ‘ the principle ’ of accom-
plishing what  ‘ [her] late father would have wanted for the child he never lived to see ’ . 69 
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The charities, meanwhile, accepted that their resources and needs were  ‘ irrelevant ’ , 70 
a concession that was to be signifi cant as the case proceeded through the courts. 
 IV. THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT 
 A. Judge Million ’ s Decision 
 Judge Million granted Heather ’ s application and awarded her  £ 50,000 out of the 
estate. Judge Million described Melita as owing Heather  ‘ the ordinary family obligations 
towards her only child who was an independent adult ’ , 71 albeit that Melita had  ‘ gone out 
of her way ’ to tell Heather that  ‘ she felt no responsibility towards her as a daughter ’ . 72 
The judge rejected the suggestion that Heather could not complain about a lack of provi-
sion because she had  ‘ thrown her lot ’ in with a man against her mother ’ s wishes. On his 
analysis,  ‘ [a] daughter is entitled (indeed would be expected) to make a life with a partner 
of her choice and a family of her own ’ , and  ‘ would reasonably hope that a parent would 
accept such a choice and not blame her for it ’ . 73 While he accepted that Heather and Nick 
 ‘ contributed to some of the later diffi culties in effecting a sustained reconciliation ’ , 74 he 
described Melita ’ s reasoning and decision as  ‘ capricious and unfair ’ 75 and  ‘ harsh and 
unreasonable ’ . 76 
 Following his application of the statutory factors in light of  Re Coventry and  Espinosa 
v Bourke , Judge Million held that an  ‘ unreasonable result ’ had been produced by the will 
in that no provision was made in circumstances of  ‘ some fi nancial need ’ . 77 Judge Million 
accepted that Heather had  ‘ some possibility in the future of obtaining part-time work ’ , 
but was conscious that she lived in an  ‘ isolated ’ village and had no driving licence. 78 
At the same time, he was clear that Heather and Nick had no expectation of provision, 
which did not mean  ‘ that the result is a reasonable one in the straightened [sic] fi nancial 
circumstances of the family ’ , but did mean  ‘ that any provision now must be limited ’ . 79 
 On the second stage, concerning what provision should be made for Heather, all 
parties were agreed that any award should take the form of a capitalised sum, albeit 
that Judge Million was conscious that such a sum  ‘ must be based on income need ’ . 80 In 
response to inevitably confl icting submissions on the size, including some that would 
have involved an award exceeding the size of the estate and had not adequately taken 
account of the effect on benefi ts, Judge Million undertook a more  ‘ rough and ready ’ 
approach. 81 Having taken account of the tax credits position, he regarded around  £ 4,000 
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as an  ‘ indicated amount of maintenance that the government accepts as being needed 
currently to provide [Heather] with a reasonable, but basic, standard of living ’ . 82 With 
reference to the  Duxbury tables used on divorce, 83 he then deduced that the amount 
needed to produce such an income would be around  £ 69,000, and reduced it in light of 
the expectation that Heather should fi nd some work to produce a sum of  £ 50,000. 
 It is easy to see why the judge ’ s conclusion and its relationship with Heather ’ s benefi ts 
position was to become such an issue in subsequent proceedings. It is not immediately 
clear why he took account of the approximately  £ 4,000 fi gure. On its own, this might 
suggest that he was intending to replace the relevant portion of Heather ’ s income, yet it 
seems clear that he was intending not to affect her entitlements. That, however, leaves the 
question why he thought she should have double the government ’ s  ‘ indicated amount ’ , 
though it may be that his objective was to ensure that the Act independently provided an 
accepted standard of living which the state could supplement, but without the need for 
the court to take into account the supplement. 
 B. The High Court in 2009 
 Heather appealed as to quantum (ie the second stage), prompting the charities to cross-
appeal the fi nding that Melita ’ s will had not made reasonable fi nancial provision for her 
(the fi rst stage). 84 The charities successfully convinced Eleanor King J that Judge Million 
had erred in law by asking the wrong question, because he had focused on whether Melita 
had acted unreasonably (which was the explicit judicial approach under the 1938 Act 85 
but not the 1975 Act) rather than whether the result produced by the will was objec-
tively unreasonable. Heather and Nick had not expected any provision, and Heather had 
apparently accepted that situation. Moreover,  ‘ the single most relevant fact which deter-
mined the deceased ’ s decision to exclude the daughter from her will was a breach of the 
most profound and enduring nature  … from a time when the daughter was only 17 years 
old ’ . 86 Heather ’ s circumstances were due to  ‘ lifestyle choices ’ , and there was no basis 
on which the family could look forward to a windfall. 87 A  ‘ weighty factor ’ was required 
before an applicant with earning capacity could succeed and there was nothing in the 
ordinary obligations of a mother or the conduct of the parties that could constitute one. 88 
 Eleanor King J held that in any event, Judge Million had erred in his balancing of 
the section 3 factors. He had overemphasised subjective reasons, failed to take a holistic 
approach to the factors and come  ‘ perilously close to allowing necessitous circumstances 
to be determinative ’ . 89 In her view,  ‘ the court was left with a fi lial relationship and neces-
sitous circumstances with nothing more of suffi cient cogency to drive a court to conclude 
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that, in all the circumstances of the case, no provision for the daughter was unreason-
able provision ’ . 90 The charities ’ cross-appeal was allowed and Heather ’ s appeal dismissed 
(without her submissions on quantum having been heard). 
 C. The Court of  Appeal in 2011 
 Heather successfully appealed against Eleanor King J ’ s decision. 91 In the Court of Appeal, 
Sir Nicholas Wall asserted that he did not base his decision  ‘ on the ground that a claim 
under the Act can properly be used to relieve the State of the obligation to support an 
applicant ’ . 92 Similarly, on Arden LJ ’ s analysis,  ‘ [t]he fact that the State makes provision 
for fi nancial hardship does not mean that it is reasonable for a testatrix to make no provi-
sion for an adult child ’ . 93 
 Sir Nicholas Wall held that he could not sustain Eleanor King J ’ s criticism of the 
District Judge because Judge Million had explicitly asked whether the result was unrea-
sonable. Black LJ agreed, although she acknowledged that he had also evaluated Melita ’ s 
conduct earlier in his judgment. Moreover, Judge Million was not required to  ‘ “ balance ” 
the section 3 factors or to explain why the combination of factors under section 3 led him 
to the conclusion that no provision was unreasonable ’ . 94 
 Sir Nicholas Wall directed that  ‘ the appellant ’ s appeal against the quantum of the 
district judge ’ s decision be heard by a judge other than Eleanor King J ’ . 95 The Supreme 
Court then refused permission to appeal the Court of Appeal ’ s conclusion. 96 Given the 
subsequent emphasis on testamentary freedom and the suggestion that Heather was 
somewhat fortunate in the Supreme Court ’ s eventual judgment on quantum, one can 
perhaps detect a tinge of regret that permission to appeal on the fi rst stage was refused. 
 Writing after the 2011 Court of Appeal decision, Conway opined that 
 There is little doubt that the  … decision strengthens the idea of adult children being able to 
make a successful fi nancial provision claim despite not having been fi nancially dependent on 
their parent (even for many years), and raises questions as to what steps a testator can actually 
take to disinherit an adult child. 97 
 She accused the court of  ‘ merely pa[ying] lip service to the notion of testamentary 
 freedom ’ , 98 an issue that would rear its head again when the Court of Appeal was next 
to give judgment in the case. That said, it must also be borne in mind that, through-
out the life of the 1975 Act, it has been a calculated risk to  ‘ disinherit ’ children who 
might need maintenance in the future, and that the deceased ’ s views and intentions have 
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always been somewhat relevant to, but obviously not conclusive of, the appropriate level 
of provision.  Ilott , moreover, was by no means the most dramatic case in which provi-
sion has been made for an adult child. In  Re Land (decd) , 99 for example, an adult son 
successfully claimed provision from his mother ’ s estate notwithstanding his conviction 
for her gross negligent manslaughter and the resulting application of the forfeiture rule 100 
to his share under her will (albeit that the case can be explained in part by the court ’ s 
inability to modify the rule ’ s application due to delay). Moreover, it has been seen that 
neither disapproval of lifestyle 101 nor estrangement 102 has inevitably prevented awards in 
previous cases. 
 D. The High Court in 2014 
 Despite the Court of Appeal ’ s hope that a further hearing could in fact be avoided, 
Parker J gave judgment upholding Judge Million ’ s conclusion in 2014. 103 Parker J rejected 
the argument that the sum paid to Melita on Thomas ’ s death should be paid to Heather 
because it derived from Thomas, since there was  ‘ no evidence to suggest that this sum was 
anything other than a payment to the deceased as widow ’ . 104 Judge Million ’ s award was 
 ‘ intended to provide the claimant with a windfall for her to spend as she liked in improv-
ing her circumstances ’ . 105 He had not been given the material with which to ascertain the 
precise effect on benefi ts, but Parker J had not been given it even then. It could not be 
said that the judge was wrong  ‘ in taking the view that notwithstanding that the claimant 
and her husband and family lived in straightened circumstances, the fact they had done 
so for so many years did not justify an award which improved their  circumstances ’ , 106 
which appears to accept that the award had no substantive effect. Nevertheless, Parker J 
opined that it could not be correct that  ‘ because there will be no benefi t to the claimant 
unless her housing need is met, the award must achieve that result ’ , since that would 
render  ‘ meaningless ’ Judge Million ’ s conclusion that the lack of expectation tempered 
the award. 107 
 E. The Court of  Appeal in 2015 
 Heather then appealed Parker J ’ s conclusion on quantum. Giving judgment on the 
case for the second time in the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ identifi ed two  ‘ fundamental 
errors ’ in Judge Million ’ s approach. 108 The fi rst was the fact that the judge stated that 
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the award should be  ‘ limited ’ because of the applicant ’ s lack of expectation of provision 
and her ability to live within her current means, but wrongly omitted to explain  ‘ what 
the award might otherwise have been and to what extent it was limited by the matters 
in  question ’ . 109 The second error was the judge ’ s failure to verify what effect his award 
would have on the applicant ’ s entitlement to state benefi ts, simply assuming that a large 
capital payment (even including the one he made) would disentitle the family to most, 
if not all, of their benefi ts. 
 In light of those perceived errors, the Court of Appeal proceeded to exercise the 
discretion afresh, considering the section 3 factors in relation to the facts as they stood 
at the time of its own judgment. In doing so, Arden LJ noted that the charities did not 
have any relevant resources or needs, and that anything they received from the estate was 
a windfall. In addition, they were not held to have any expectation of such a benefi t, since 
Melita had had no involvement with them during her lifetime. 
 While Arden LJ accepted that Heather was an adult child living independently  – a 
relevant factor meaning  ‘ at a minimum ’ that the court was  ‘ not concerned to provide 
her with an income that would fully support her needs ’ 110  – Arden LJ also agreed that 
Heather ’ s current standard of living was not conclusive regarding the appropriate 
level of maintenance, and reaffi rmed that an adult child did not need to show a moral 
obligation or other special circumstance in order to succeed. The absence of an expec-
tation of inheritance on her part was not to be given  ‘ much weight ’ , since Arden LJ 
upheld Judge Million ’ s fi nding that Heather  ‘ was deprived of any expectation primarily 
because Melita had acted in an unreasonable, capricious and harsh way towards her 
only child ’ . 111 
 In response to confl icting submissions from Heather and the charities on the weight 
that should be attached to Melita ’ s testamentary intentions, Arden LJ concluded that 
Parliament had  ‘ entrusted the courts with the power to ensure, in the case of even an adult 
child, that reasonable fi nancial provision is made for maintenance only ’ , and that this 
limitation itself gave appropriate weight to testamentary freedom at least in cases where 
the other claimants on the estate have no demonstrated need or expectation. 112 She later 
accepted, however, the need to balance claims on the estate  ‘ fairly ’ , 113 albeit surprisingly 
suggesting that the charities were  ‘ not prejudiced ’ by a higher award. 114 Arden LJ refused 
to hold that the estrangement should eliminate or substantially diminish an appropriate 
award. There was no suggestion that Heather had wanted to be estranged from Melita, 
Heather ’ s disapproved lifestyle choices had nevertheless allowed her to become a success-
ful mother and homemaker, and fault for the estrangement was diffi cult to apportion and 
might even have been absent. 
 In evaluating Heather ’ s needs and resources, Arden LJ noted the absence of any 
savings and her limited income and earning capacity, the latter being something that 
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could only have diminished since Judge Million ’ s original decision. Even including her 
state benefi ts, it was held that Heather ’ s resources were  ‘ at such a basic level that they 
outweigh the importance that would normally be attached to the fact that [she] is an 
adult child who had been living independently for so many years ’ . 115 Having earlier recog-
nised that the size of the estate did not  ‘ impinge ’ on the award sought, 116 and aiming to 
preserve the family ’ s state benefi ts, Arden LJ ultimately concluded that Heather should 
receive  £ 143,000 to enable her to purchase the housing association property, in addition 
to the reasonable costs of the purchase. Heather was also given an option to claim up 
to  £ 20,000 as a capital sum from the estate, in order to provide  ‘ a very small additional 
income to supplement her state benefi ts ’ . 117 
 The Court of Appeal ’ s judgment caused a stir in some quarters, not least to the 
Comment Editor of the  Daily Telegraph , who wrote the day after the judgment that  ‘ [a]ll 
of a sudden, the judges are trampling on the deepest and darkest fabric of family life ’ . 118 
Moreover, despite its interview with Heather considered earlier in this chapter (which 
may have saved her from some abuse), the  Daily Mail also published a comment piece 
by Max Hastings, under the headline  ‘ Who are judges to tell us who we can leave our 
money to in our wills! ’ , in which he acknowledged the  ‘ compassion ’ of the decision but 
intemperately attacked it as  ‘ as yet another example of the mounting alienation between 
[lawyers] and the rest of humanity ’ . 119 Both the  Daily Telegraph and  Daily Mail columns 
conveniently omitted to mention the fact that, while one can legitimately query its exer-
cise on particular facts, the judiciary ’ s power was expressly conferred by Parliament via 
the 1975 Act. While it might reasonably be construed as an attack on the core principle of 
testamentary freedom, particularly if it limits the extent to which testamentary intentions 
should be specifi cally evaluated against reasonable fi nancial provision, the 2015 decision 
stopped very far short of introducing the kind of  ‘ forced heirship ’ associated with civil 
law jurisdictions. 
 While  Ilott at this stage did not therefore represent a sea change in the law, the portion 
of the estate awarded to Heather was considerable (albeit that her need was relatively 
high) and the judgment provided pause for thought to solicitors advising clients wishing 
to exclude adult children from their wills, particularly in favour of non-natural persons 
such as charities. Whatever the complaints, the Law Commission ’ s most recent report 
to consider the 1975 Act recommended no change in the approach to adult children and 
appeared to assume that any reform would be in the direction of facilitating increased 
rather than decreased provision for adult children in any event. 120 The charities, mean-
while, appealed to the Supreme Court. 
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 V. THE SUPREME COURT ’ S DECISION 
 A. Lord Hughes ’ s Main Judgment 
 The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the charities ’ appeal, restoring Judge Million ’ s 
original  £ 50,000 order. Lord Hughes (with whose main judgment all six other Justices 
agreed) accepted that  ‘ [s]ome of the factors inevitably dealt with in [the Supreme Court ’ s] 
judgment may apply also to types of case other than those of adult children living sepa-
rately from the deceased ’ , but he was clear that  ‘ there is no occasion for this court to 
attempt to meet every diffi culty to which claims for family provision may give rise ’ . 121 
 Lord Hughes reasserted the centrality of testamentary freedom in English law. He 
emphasised the importance of the 1975 Act ’ s limitation to  ‘ reasonable fi nancial provision ’ 
for maintenance for non-spouse/civil partner applicants, refl ecting what was described as 
a  ‘ deliberate legislative decision ’ that was  ‘ important ’ . 122 He also held that a need for 
maintenance was a necessary but not suffi cient condition for a successful claim. 
 The Supreme Court considered the maintenance standard at some length. Lord 
Hughes approved previous case law in holding that maintenance could not  ‘ extend to 
any or every thing which it would be desirable for the claimant to have ’ , 123 but was not 
limited to  ‘ subsistence ’ either. 124 Needs would not necessarily be the measure of what is 
provided by the court if it has been concluded that reasonable fi nancial provision has not 
been made by the will and/or the intestacy rules: the claims of others, and importantly 
the relationship between the claimant and the deceased, could justifi ably limit the size of 
the award. 
 Lord Hughes also confi rmed that the focus of the correct test under the 1975 Act 
is not on the behaviour of the testatrix, but opined the reasonableness of her decision 
(not always easily distinguishable from that of a result) may still be a signifi cant consid-
eration. This is also true of the extent of any  ‘ moral claim ’ , which will often be at the 
centre of the decision under the 1975 Act, particularly in claims by adult children capable 
of living independently, even if that is not a  ‘ sine qua non ’ . 125 While Lord Hughes did 
not reject the traditional two-stage approach to the Act, he did say that in many cases 
 ‘ exactly the same conclusions will both answer the question whether reasonable fi nan-
cial provision has been made for the claimant and identify what that fi nancial provision 
should be ’ . 126 
 The Supreme Court unanimously held that Judge Million had not made either error 
alleged by the Court of Appeal. On the fi rst (that he did not explain what the award 
would have been had it not been  ‘ limited ’ ), the Act required  ‘ a single assessment  … 
of what reasonable fi nancial provision should be made in all the circumstances of the 
case ’ . 127 It did not require the judge  ‘ to fi x some hypothetical standard of reasonable 
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provision and then either add to it, or discount from it  … for variable factors ’ . 128 The 
two dominant factors in the case were the estrangement and Heather ’ s straitened circum-
stances, and Lord Hughes even suggested that it would have been legitimate for the judge 
to have concluded that it was entirely reasonable for no provision to be made at all in the 
will because of the estrangement (a matter on which leave to appeal had of course been 
refused by the Supreme Court in 2011). The judge was therefore defi nitely able to say 
that  ‘ what reasonable provision would be was coloured by the nature of the relationship 
between mother and daughter ’ . 129 The Court of Appeal ’ s order, by contrast, had given 
 ‘ little if any weight ’ to the length of the estrangement between the protagonists. 130 
 The Supreme Court was also concerned that again  ‘ little if any weight ’ had been 
given by the Court of Appeal ’ s order to Melita ’ s very clear wishes. 131 It was incorrect to 
say that the charities ’ lack of any expectation of benefi t was on a par with Heather ’ s lack 
of any similar expectation. They were the benefi ciaries under Melita ’ s will, and were not 
required to justify their claim to the estate with reference to needs in the same way that 
Heather did. The Court of Appeal had erred in suggesting that they were not prejudiced 
by a higher award to Heather because they could not plead human needs, which is signifi -
cant in light of their concession at trial that their needs and resources were irrelevant. 
Clearly the benefi t to an estate benefi ciary is inherently reduced by an order under the 
1975 Act. The Supreme Court was sympathetic to the general position of charities in 
this context, emphasising that they  ‘ depend heavily on testamentary bequests for their 
work, which is by defi nition of public benefi t and in many cases will be for demonstrably 
humanitarian purposes ’ . 132 One study indeed suggests that over 25 per cent of charitable 
donations come from wills. 133 The Supreme Court also considered it erroneous to suggest 
that the court had no need to give specifi c consideration to Melita ’ s wishes because Parlia-
ment had limited claims under the 1975 Act to particular circumstances. Those wishes 
were relevant factors and fell to be considered alongside the others. 
 On the second alleged error, that Judge Million had been unaware of the effect of his 
order on Heather ’ s entitlement to benefi ts, the Supreme Court held that Judge Million 
had in fact addressed the impact on benefi ts. Lord Hughes regarded the essence of the 
Court of Appeal ’ s criticism to be that the judge ’ s order would have little or no value to 
Heather because of the impact on her benefi ts. He, however, held that if Heather spent 
the  £ 50,000 in a particular way, that impact would be minimised. In fact, Lord Hughes 
suggested that the Court of Appeal had somewhat ironically given insuffi cient attention 
to the impact of its own order on Heather ’ s benefi ts position. That said, Lady Hale was 
prepared to accept that the Court of Appeal ’ s order was  ‘ benefi ts-effi cient ’ from both 
Heather and the public ’ s point of view. 134 
 The conclusion that Judge Million had made neither alleged error was suffi cient to 
dispose of the case: the  £ 50,000 award met many of Heather ’ s needs for maintenance, 
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allowing her to  ‘ buy much needed household goods and have a family holiday ’ , 135 and 
should be restored. These suggested uses for the money may not obviously be consist-
ent with Judge Million ’ s calculations, which were based on a comprehensive (albeit 
basic) standard of living. On Lord Hughes ’ s analysis, however, it was  ‘ a central feature 
of Mrs Ilott ’ s fi nancial position that although the family could manage  – just  – on its 
income, this was at the cost of being unable to maintain the ordinary domestic equipment 
on which every household depends ’ . 136 He also held that, although Judge Million had 
taken into account what the government regarded as a minimum level of income,  ‘ he did 
not make his award on this basis ’ , 137 and produced an approximated award refl ecting the 
fact that Heather ’ s needs exceeded driving lessons and a small amount of capital. 
 Even if housing provision had been appropriate, Lord Hughes held that a life interest 
would have been preferable to capital, even though the parties had agreed at trial that 
any award should take the form of capitalised maintenance. While there is no reason why 
housing cannot be maintenance in some cases, Lord Hughes emphasised that the overall 
power is to provide for maintenance and that housing is more likely to be provided by way 
of a life interest rather than a capital sum. 
 Lord Hughes appeared to approve the relevance of care to 1975 Act cases. He consid-
ered a hypothetical contrasting case to  Ilott involving a 
 claimant [who was] a child of the deceased who had remained exceptionally and confi dentially 
close to her mother throughout, had supported and nurtured her in her old age at some cost 
in time and money to herself, and  … had been promised many times that she would be looked 
after in the will. 
 While  ‘ adhering to the concept of maintenance ’ , he held that  ‘ a judge ought in such 
circumstances to attach importance to the closeness of the relationship in arriving at his 
assessment of what reasonable fi nancial provision requires ’ . 138 That said, he was also 
anxious that  ‘ care must be taken to avoid making awards under the 1975 Act primarily 
rewards for good behaviour on the part of the claimant or penalties for bad on the part 
of the deceased ’ . 139 
 B. Lady Hale ’ s Powerful Supplement 
 Lady Hale then gave a striking supplementary judgment, with which Lords Wilson and 
Kerr agreed. As has been seen, she observed that  Ilott raised  ‘ some profound questions 
about the nature of family obligations, the relationship between family obligations and 
the state, and the relationship between the freedom of property owners to dispose of 
their property as they see fi t and their duty to fulfi l their family obligations ’ , claim-
ing that  ‘ none [of those questions are] answered by the legislation which [the Supreme 
Court] had to apply ’ . 140 It may be true that the questions are not conclusively resolved 
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on the face of the 1975 Act, but the Supreme Court did manage to resolve the case. In 
any event, Lady Hale criticised  ‘ the unsatisfactory state of the present law ’ for  ‘ giving  … 
no guidance as to the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether an adult 
child is deserving or undeserving of reasonable maintenance ’ , particularly in light of 
the range of public views on the point. 141 She took the unusual step of expressing  ‘ regret 
that the Law Commission did not reconsider the fundamental principles underlying such 
claims when last they dealt with this topic in 2011 ’ . 142 It is somewhat ironic that, with 
her family law background, Lady Hale is entirely accustomed to applying, and, indeed, 
giving authoritative guidance on, 143 section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
whose only remotely clear  ‘ answer ’ is that the welfare of minor children of the family 
should be given fi rst consideration in relief on divorce. 144 It is clear from her judgment, 
however, that she regarded the question of maintaining spouses and that of maintaining 
children as signifi cantly different. 
 C. Implications 
 The end result will be a relief for the charities, who took a fi nancial and reputational 
risk in fi ghting the case all the way to the Supreme Court, which gave judgment well 
over 12 years after Melita ’ s death. The charities did so largely on principle because of 
the possible wide impact of the Court of Appeal ’ s approach. The decision will also be 
welcomed by many private client practitioners and those who support the idea that prop-
erty rights extend to control on death and that able-bodied adult children should not be 
able to disrupt testamentary intentions. 
 Some of the clearly contestable elements of the Court of Appeal ’ s judgment, such as 
the suggestion that the charities were not prejudiced by a higher award to Heather, have 
been satisfactorily resolved. But the Supreme Court ’ s decision may itself be questioned 
in some respects. There would arguably be little point in the 1975 Act ’ s application to 
non-spouse/civil partnership cases if it were not able to raise a claimant ’ s standard of 
living reasonably signifi cantly beyond what is available from state benefi ts. Otherwise, 
the Act would simply become a means for the state to save money rather than genu-
inely assisting those expressly listed as potential applicants, the money-saving potential 
of the Family Protection Act 1955 having been expressly recognised by the legislature in 
New Zealand. 145 On the basis that the English Act is aimed at improving living standards 
beyond benefi ts, Heather had a need for maintenance by the standards of many people, 
and since the courts are often reluctant to consider the conduct regarding the relation-
ships of the protagonists in intra-family disputes, as Lord Hughes recognised, it could 
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be seen as surprising for the Supreme Court to accept that her claim should be quite so 
limited with reference to the relationship between mother and daughter. That said, if it is 
arguable that positive contributions and conduct should be given some recognition within 
the limitations of maintenance, 146 a general idea that Lord Hughes appeared cautiously 
to approve, that is consistent with his reasoning on the converse case, where parent and 
child have not been close at all. 
 The debate over the proper balance between testamentary freedom and provision for 
family members will inevitably continue. For now, it seems as though the  ‘ testamentary 
freedom ’ camp are in a stronger position than they were before the Supreme Court ’ s 
decision. But it should be remembered that Heather Ilott still went away with something 
despite being left out of her mother ’ s will (even if similar future claimants may not be so 
lucky and the details of an arrangement between her and the charities are not public), and 
it will be interesting to see whether Lady Hale ’ s plea for reform is heeded. 
 D. Academic Reaction 
 On Douglas ’ s analysis, the Supreme Court ’ s decision  ‘ will surely give pause to those who 
might be planning a challenge to wills of this kind; one may expect them now to face a 
harder task in satisfying the court that the deceased ’ s wishes should be  overridden ’ . 147 
Conway describes the case as one where  ‘ the right outcome  … [was] more or less reached 
on the facts ’ , but asserts that  ‘ important issues remain ’ . 148 In her view,  ‘ [f]or all the 
attention it attracted,  Ilott was an atypical case, [such] that few other applications will 
replicate this particular scenario ’ . 149 She fi nds it  ‘ hard to disagree with the Supreme 
Court ’ s assessment of the judgment below and the reasons for overturning it ’ , since 
both estrangement and benefi ts were part of the factual matrix that the District Judge 
supportably took into account. 150 
 Conway regards the Supreme Court ’ s extensive analysis of the 1975 Act as  ‘ the more 
pertinent aspects of the judgment  … likely to infl uence future claims under the Act ’ . 151 
On her analysis, while  ‘ the Court of Appeal judgments  … were seen as turning points, 
signifying that adult children who had been disinherited (whether wholly or partly) could 
succeed and be given a signifi cant award, despite not having been fi nancially reliant on 
their dead parent ’ ,  ‘ the Supreme Court ruling suggests otherwise, and that independ-
ent adult children who lack  “ reasonable fi nancial provision ” will probably receive much 
less generous awards than the Court of Appeal gave Heather Ilott ’ . 152 In doing so, she 
considers that the Supreme Court  ‘ probably return[ed] the law to its pre- Ilott position ’ . 153 
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It  ‘ reassures will-makers that, while their wishes may not always be respected, they now 
have much more prominence in family provision claims ’ . 154 Conversely,  ‘ independent 
adult children who have been disinherited by their parents will take little comfort from 
the Supreme Court ruling, and lawyers advising them should downgrade the chances of 
success or caution about more modest awards ’ . 155 As Probert puts it  ‘ assessing what was 
said  – and what was not said  – reveals a very strong preference for individuals being 
able to exercise their economic power beyond the grave ’ . 156 She opines, however, that  ‘ the 
case offers little by way of specifi c guidance for future litigants, even where the facts are 
substantially similar ’ , and (perhaps more surprisingly) that  ‘ [i]t also makes it very diffi -
cult even to identify the crucial factors in  Ilott itself ’ . 157 
 Despite broadly supporting the result, Conway admits that: 
 One might question whether, in an era of reduced public spending and ongoing welfare reforms, 
Melita Jackson should have been able to leave an estate worth almost half a million pounds to 
three animal welfare charities while her daughter and her family survived almost exclusively on 
benefi ts and a small sum of savings. 
 She does, however, also say that  ‘ [r]eplacing state provision with estate provision in cases 
such as these would be extremely controversial, raising complex issues of law and social 
policy ’ , and it is unclear whether a debate on the matter will be had. 158 
 E. The Infl uence of   Ilott on Subsequent Cases 
 The Supreme Court ’ s decision in  Ilott has already been cited by the Court of Appeal in 
 Lewis v Warner , 159 by the High Court in  Re Wynford Hodge , 160  Ball v Ball , 161  Banfi eld 
v Campbell , 162  Ubbi v Ubbi 163 and  Wellesley v Earl Cowley , 164 by County Courts in 
 Re Nahajec 165 and  Miles v Miles , 166 and by the Family Court in  M v M . 167 The last deci-
sion did not concern the 1975 Act at all:  M was an ancillary relief on a divorce case in 
which  Ilott was cited to highlight the difference between an  ‘ evaluative ’ and a  ‘ discretion-
ary ’ determination. 168 
 Lewis v Warner involved a claim by a former cohabitant who was wealthy but sought 
the ability via the 1975 Act to buy the property that he had shared with the deceased 
for full valuable consideration, arguing that he needed to remain there because of his 
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age and disability. Counsel for the deceased ’ s daughter relied on  Ilott to submit that the 
applicant  ‘ had failed to advance a case that he  needed any fi nancial provision for his 
maintenance out of the deceased ’ s estate (being signifi cantly fi nancially better off than 
the deceased, and able to afford alternative accommodation) ’ . 169 Signifi cantly for present 
purposes, Sir Geoffrey Vos said that  ‘ [i]t is not actually necessary to look behind  Ilott ’ 
in elucidating the relevant case law,  ‘ because the relevant preceding cases are all referred 
to within Lord Hughes ’ s seminal judgment ’ . 170 Similarly, in  Ball v Ball it was said that 
 Espinosa does not add anything to  Ilott . 171 In  Lewis , lengthy passages were said to  ‘ [be] 
directly relevant to what this court has to decide ’ and  ‘ provide the legal background with-
out the need to trawl through the pre-existing authorities ’ . 172 There were said to be  ‘ clear 
indications ’ in Lord Hughes ’ s judgment that  ‘ the broad concept of  “ maintenance ”    … 
can extend to the provision of a house in which the applicant can live, albeit that it 
might most often be provided by way of a life interest ’ . 173 Mindful of  Ilott ’ s approach 
to needs, moral obligations and the appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal upheld 
the fi rst instance decision that the applicant should be allowed to purchase the prop-
erty. Sir  Geoffrey ’ s remarks were themselves cited in  Banfi eld v Campbell in the course 
of granting the claimant a life interest in half the sale proceeds of his former partner ’ s 
home for the purposes of providing alternative accommodation (with only a limited lump 
sum kept available in case adaptation was required). In  Re Wynford Hodge it was said 
that  Ilott  ‘ emphasised that the statutory power is to provide maintenance, not to confer 
capital ’ , 174 albeit that on the facts of the case the care needs of the applicant made capital 
provision reasonable. In  Re Nahajec the facts were said to be very similar to  Ilott and 
extensive reference was made to it. 175 In allowing the claim, the judge was adamant that 
he had done so not simply because  Ilott had done so, but did note that  ‘ in  Ilott the claim-
ant could meet her outgoings from her own resources but nevertheless it was considered 
that that did not disqualify her from an award ’ . 176 The judge noted that he was awarding 
the claimant in  Re Nahajec 11.3 per cent of the net estate, which was within 1 per cent 
of the 10.3 per cent awarded to Heather. 177 In  Ubbi v Ubbi , Master Shuman recognised 
 Ilott ’ s emphasis on testamentary freedom and the limitations of maintenance, but also 
that maintenance was not limited to subsistence in making provision for minor children 
born after their father ’ s last will was made.  Ball v Ball , by contrast, is an example of a 
claim by estranged adult children failing following  Ilott because the estate was small, the 
applicants ’ needs were not signifi cantly different from those of the will benefi ciaries and 
neither the deceased ’ s conduct nor her husband ’ s sexual abuse of the claimants created 
a moral obligation. Somewhat similarly, a  £ 20,000 legacy was said to be reasonable in 
the context of 35-year estrangement despite a large estate and reliance on benefi ts in 
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 Wellesley v Earl Cowley , with the judge adopting a single determination approach to the 
Act. In  Miles v Miles , moreover, Judge Farquhar invoked  Ilott in holding that the District 
Judge below had given insuffi cient weight to the testator ’ s wishes, and reduced the quan-
tum for his separated widow. 
 Aside from case law per se, the Law Commission cited  Ilott in discussing the rela-
tionship between mutual wills and the 1975 Act in its Consultation Paper on wills, 
noting that Lady Hale  ‘ was critical of the lack of guidance provided in the statute as to 
how the court should deal with claims for fi nancial provision ’ . 178 Internationally,  Ilott 
was widely cited in the South Australian Law Reform Institute ’ s recent report on family 
provision. 179 
 It is arguable that in none of these instances did  Ilott make a fundamental difference 
to the matter under discussion. But it is plausible to argue that  Ilott has become the 
 ‘ go-to ’ authority under the 1975 Act (even in cases not involving children), and that its 
infl uence has already extended beyond that Act. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 On what basis might  Ilott be described as a  ‘ landmark ’ case, particularly given the short 
time between the Supreme Court handing down its judgment and this chapter being writ-
ten ? The fact that it received quite so much judicial consideration over so many years is 
surely a key factor. There is also the fact that it was the fi rst substantive consideration at 
the highest judicial level of the 1975 Act (more than 40 years after its enactment), and it 
may remain the only such example for some time. This is surely signifi cant, even if  Ilott ’ s 
importance might have been greater still had the Supreme Court granted the charities 
permission to appeal the threshold stage in 2011. 
 More substantively,  Ilott may not have broken entirely new ground, but it does confi rm 
some vitally important principles both in respect of claims by adult children and under 
the 1975 Act generally. Conway has argued explicitly that  ‘ [t]he Supreme Court ruling 
in  Ilott is not a landmark one in the sense of fundamentally altering the law on family 
provision ’ , but that  ‘ it is an important one in terms of analysing the 1975 Act and its 
operation, and emphasising some core principles ’ . 180 These include: that  ‘ maintenance ’ 
can be provided even where it is literally possible for an applicant to live without it, and 
that it can improve an applicant ’ s situation beyond what is available from state benefi ts 
(even if the latter issue is crying out for further clarifi cation); that a moral obligation or 
claim is not a required feature of a claim by an adult child; that testamentary freedom is 
an important value that should be given specifi c consideration by a judge deciding a 1975 
Act claim; that non-human entities are not to be prejudiced by the Act merely because 
they do not have needs that are comparable to those of humans; that care on the one hand 
and estrangement on the other are both relevant but not decisive; that the absence of any 
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expectation of provision is not necessarily fatal; and that a life interest is generally to be 
preferred to capital housing provision under the Act. 
 Moreover, if the true test is that people keep on talking about  Ilott , 181 the level of 
media coverage and the likely impact of  Ilott on relevant textbook chapters 182 might be 
suffi cient in themselves to qualify it as a  ‘ landmark ’ case. There is also a possibility that 
Lady Hale ’ s plea for reform will be heeded and that  Ilott will herald the beginning of a 
new phase in the life of the 1975 Act. Whether or not this is a realistic prospect, it seems 
highly likely that  Ilott will be cited and discussed for decades to come. 
